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LET' S STOP HELPING THE POOR
Donald Feldstein
Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York
The time has come in America to stop trying to help the poor.
These efforts have resulted in poor services, inadequate levels
of aid, stigma to the recipients, creation of a permanent welfare
class, cheating, and the exacerbation of divisiveness in America
between classes and ethnic groups.
In large part, these negative
effects are due to the attempt to target or pinpoint aid for the
poor alone; but the poor can only be helped in the context of
programs for all Americans.
The selective forms of servicing the poor, so predominant in
the United States, are reminiscent of a newspaper story, read as
a child.
It happened in one of those towns in which fire department services were on a subscription basis. As one non-subscribed
house began to burn, the firemen gathered around, hoses poised at
neighboring buildings whose owners were subscribers, ready to swing
into action if these buildings caught fire, but allowing the nonsubscribed building to burn down.
By and large, this kind of arrangement no longer exists.
We
seem to have accepted the proposition that fire protection is a
basic social utility, necessar
to the orderly functioning of society-, and necessarily available to all.
But if this tradition were not so strong, one could conceive
of a local legislator pointing out that perhaps 70' of the cost of
running the fire department goes to 20" of the community, because
in one area factory owners have not built adequately safe plants.
Perhaps factory owners should pa- for fire service.
Or this mythical legislator might argue in the name of equity and social justice
that 'he rich should pay a fairer
share for tieir
fire
services;
while the firemen might come on call
to put out a
fire,
perhaps
the owners of various properties should be billed
based on their
abilit- to pav.
Or legislation could be introduced building in
certain incentives, so that
houses or factories
which had anti"ire features wou]h1 be chargeC less, and those without safet ,
features would le
charged an extra premium if
they had a fire.
V ere we no- used to the concept of fire
services beinz a basic
l!tilit"- available 'o all, without specific
or means tested cost,
liese suggestions could be seen as forward looking ideas to promote equit- and safety.
Pu-, of course, there would be 'laws in such "reforms".
There would be arguments and counter-arguments about who is really
to blame for high fire rates in the glhetto.
A bureaucrac
would
have to be created to dev.'elop the financial test under which people would pay differential fees for fire service.
Inspectors
Would hlave to certif- the level of fire safet - in each dwelling.
'\notier group of inspectors would have to police the system to see
-
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that bribery and corruption were checked.

The thrust of fire pre-

vention would be on who belonged in what category, rather than on
Fundamental cleavages would
making all of society less fireprone.
begin to arise between those who were below the paying line, getting a free service, and those who were above the line, paying for
fire service. Those who paid, particularly those who were just a
little bit above the level of the nonpayers, would inevitably feel
resentful and put upon, and point up to any number of cases of
cheating; by some other standard, they would be more eligible for
the free service than a number of people who were now getting the
free service.
Happily, no such move seems to be under way in the area of
fire services. Society seems to be committed to the idea of fire
available to all, for a number of
service as a fundamental utility
reasons:

1. Particularly in the crowded cities, there is almost no
such thing as a fire which affects only the owner of a given property, and the recognition of interdependence forces us to generalize the service.

2. Most people are aware of the fact that there is a tax system which, however well or poorly, does attempt to provide the equity in financing, so that the rich pay more and the poor less for
municipal services, including fire.
3. There is an unspoken decision by society that in the area
of fire, as in other disaster situations, we are fundamentally one
society, each dedicated to helping the other and responsible for
one another, and that the traditional considerations of the marketplace do not apply.
But these same principles apply in other areas of human services as well. Not too long ago it appeared that the expansion of
such universal social utilities as fire services, available to all,
was an inevitable trend. From free high school we would go to free
public education, at least through two years of community college;
from Social Security we would go to Medicare, to health care for
all.
Even in that most troublesome area of income maintenance, we
might move toward universal family allowances, as exist in other
developed societies.
This trend seems to have been reversed, first with the War on
There was a clear
Poverty, and most significantly since 1969.
Nixon philosophy continued by the Ford administration. It has become a part of domestic social planning to such an extent that even
liberal thinkers in social policy have been carried in its wake.
The Nixon social programs were consistently and fundamentally
selective in their approach. They were based on a concept of American society which sees the market ideally taking care of everybody, but provides for certain kinds of special charitable programs for the casualties of the market society. This approach is

- 148-

the ver-y opposite of the creation of broad, universal social utilities, replacing the market in key areas of human need.
A selective social welfare program is a means tested program, any program in which the eligibility
for
the program, or the
cost of participation in the program, is based on a determination
of a given individual's ability to pay.
Public welfare is, of
course, the prime example, but it is true of food stamps, housing
subsidies, Medicaid, sliding scale child welfare and day care programs, and fees set by a voluntary counseling service. A universal service is a service available to every:one, or to a certain
class or category- of people withoui individual testing of financial means.
Thus the Social Security program's benefits are availatle only to people who have reached a certain age and have retired, but no individual has to prove his
financial
eligibility.
Other examples of universal programs are Medicare, Unemployment Insurance, fire services, public parks, some veteran's benefits,
police services and the public school system.
One can understand w.- a Nixon or a Ford -ould not support
such programs.
Committed to the market society, they still believe that the market is the mechanism and the vehicle for all
good things, and social welfare's only function is to pick up the
casualties of the market.
This is true in the area of health care
where Nixon proposed a dual sy-stem, one for the employed and one
for the unemployed.
It was the Nixon approach in the proposed Family Assistance Plan, which was a means tested
program.
It is how
Nixon approachee child care, espousing .,elfare
day care, but vetoing a more general child care program in the Mondale Bill.
But this
article
seeks to explore why even liberal
policy
makers and planners have been carried along by the selective
wave.
Daniel Mo'nihan once fought for children's
allowances (universal)
as a sounder answer to poverty in America than a negative income
tax.
The former would provide a monthly%check to ever- child in
America; the l-'tter would give money to the poor. But in a more
recent book, Mo--nihan refers
to the Nixon Family Assistance Plan
(which was a kind of negative income tax) almost interchangeably
with the term famil,- allowances.
Other planners espouse special
rbograms for the poor and disadvantageO as obviously the most humane aiproach.
Nixon's was a consistent and defensible philosophy, but why
have liberal and leftist social policy people begun to support
selective programs? Why have they gone along with the Nixon culture?
The reasons are several:
1. There is a realization
that money is short, and choices do
need to be made.
Universal programs cost more money. To the extent that the- are available to all,
they are being used by people
who could pay their own way. People with large bank accounts may
- 149-

be eligible for Social Security or Unemployment Insurance.

Bene-

Thus, the natural answer to the
fits
are being "wasted" on them.
problem of limited resources would seem to be to pinpoint or limit

the service to the eligible poor, or to offer the service to every.
one, but to make those who are able pay for the service on a sliding scale.

2. From a certain perspective, a selective approach seems
fairer, no matter how large the pie, so long as it is not infinite. Rawls' A Theory of Justice and other writings have given
credence to a sense of equity which is based on a reparations approach. If we take a simplistic view of the "spaceship earth"
concept, rather than assume an ever-expanding universe, redistribution means taking from the rich and giving to the poor. If
we assume continued economic growth, we can give the poor more
of that growth while the rich expand more slowly. But we seem to
be operating on the belief in a static pool of wealth. This lends
itself to selective social welfare programs to redress wrongs.
Give the benefits to the poor!
3.
The "we"/"they" separation of society which was once seen
as stigmatizing the poor is seized upon by some thinkers now as a
positive. They seek to develop a special pride and identity for
the poor.
The Welfare Rights Organization, so vocal in the late 6 01s,
was an example of this trend. Membership was open only to the poor.
It claimed to seek to swamp the welfare system by organizing the
poor to demand their full rights. When the welfare system became so weighted down with demands, fair hearings, etc., it would
be simpler for the establishment to institute a guaranteed minimum income. An example was the spurt in demands for special
grants for winter clothing and other items (to which the poor
were previously unaware they were entitled) in New York City.
When the establishment did indeed crack, and offered a flat grant
automatically to all welfare recipients, the Welfare Rights Organization objected. It objected, not only because the flat
grants were too low, a legitimate objection, but by now W.R.O.
liked the idea of having clients get benefits through their own
efforts. W.R.O. objected to guaranteed grants for all as a tactic
to break up Ihe W.R.O.!

Thus do means and ends get reversed.

A

number of previously powerless people now have an investment in
programs for the poor, community
and selective
specialized
It has become
tions in which only the poor ma'. vote, etc.
power base. Other sincere social thinkers see selectivity
a reality,
participation
only way to make maximum feasible
the poor clout.
4.

Given the factors

mentioned
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above,

electheir
as the
to give

given the concern for

the poor and disadvantaged, liberals are now won over to selective

programs by technology. If it is now possible to have a computerized family assistance plan, if people can have their eligibility
checked in a non-stigmatizing and non-degrading way, then this takes
a major objection out of selective programs, and sociely can afford
to go ahead with them.
For instance, Nixon proposed a dual health plan, one for the
employed and one for the unemployed and poor. But if all use the
same services, and simply insert a card in a machine on their way
in or out, and this card instructs the machine whom to bill for
Cerhow much, then what harm is there is a means tested program?
tainly it would be cheaper than free health care for all, and it
would not penalize the poor.
Similarly, a negative income tax is
not stigmatizing. Everyone fills out a tax form. Some would then
give and some would get. Social planners have become enamored with
the apparent simplicity and cleanliness of such schemes. Some even
refer to a negative income tax as a universal program, which it
is not.
Thus, we have a strange coalition:
Rightists who believe in
the market, with social welfare only as a residual arm of society,
and leftists who believe in "Poor Power", or in getting the most
dollars most quickly to the poor. Together, they have developed
a strong thrust for selective social services and against the creation of new universal social services.
Let us examine the reasons for supporting selectivity in
order:
1. Money is short.
There is no denying that universal programs do cost a lot more
than selective programs, but not quite as much as would appear at
fi7ust blush.
Selective programs inevitably waste large percentages
of the money expended in administration, investigations, and bureaucracy. As soon as benefits depend on each individual's means,
operational costs multiply. (And cheating has to be expected in
spite of this multiplication.)
Consider the administrative costs
in operating the public welfare programs around the United States,
as opposed to those in the Social Security system. The former is
weighted down by eligibilitrules, investigations, and changes in
status; the latter is run by a single computer system and local
offices to answer questions.
There are also ways to cut the cost of universal programs.
Counting the income received from universal programs, such as the
present Social Security payments, or proposed family allowance
payments, as part of taxable income would result in recovering
part of the expenditures which are "wasted" on the rich. It ma,
sound foolish to give ever%-one money, and then to take some of' it
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back from the rich. But the evidence is that this would be simpler,
administratively more efficient, and fairer than deciding in advance how much to give whom.
Money could also be saved if a universal program, such as a
children's allowance, replaced current regressive allowances. Under a children's allowance, families would receive a monthly check,
say $75 for each child in the family. If this were part of taxable income, the poor would keep it all, and others would pay back
The current $750
varying amounts, more as they were more wealthy.
deduction for dependents in the income tax system works in reverse.
The poor (who pay no tax) get no benefit. The family in a 20% tax
The family in a 70% tax bracket acbracket actually gets $150.
tually gets over $500.* Ending these regressive deductions which
cost the treasury billions of dollars each year would help to offset the higher costs of replacing them with universal programs.
Economists have also become more aware of social costs. The
cost of manufacturing a product needs to include not only the cost
to the manufacturer, but the cost to society of cleaning a polluted
stream, building a road to a factory, even the cost of cleaning
curtains in homes near a smoky factory. Similarly, it's hard to
calculate the real cost of selective vs. universal programs. If
universal programs cut down the division in society, alienation,
the "we"/"they" feelings, perhaps even crime, how does one com-

pare?
Universal programs do cost more, but not as much more as
would claim, nor more than any developed country can afford.
most all developed countries have a variety of such services,
health, vocational retraining, income maintenance, day care.
ly the United States seems unable to offer them.

some
Alin
On-

2. Equity.
There is no way to discuss equity for the p,,or and disadvantaged in a political arrangement where the poor can't win. If
they don't have the clout to develop, expand and improve programs,
the kind of clout that is possible by universalizing programs so
everyone has a stake in them, then there is no equity. It is only
the universal programs that have the legislative and political support to be maintained, improved and expanded, even while selective
We
programs are cut with impunity against the will of the poor.
need only examine the improvement in benefits in Social Security
In spite of the fact that it is financed
over the past years.
by a heavy and regressive tax, there has been no great public outcry against tax increases, because everybody feels he will benefit.
On the other hand, whenever times get hard and money gets tight,
the programs for the poor suffer, just as public welfare has suffered in the years since 1969. Thus, in the long run, it is doubtful
A small non-regressive deduction has now been added to the tax
system.
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that the poor get more by pinpointing money in programs at them.
Noble sentiments, such as "plans for universal day care should
proceed only when high quality care has been atiained for those who
are really neither
lack the resources to make other arrangements",
We will attain high quality day care for those
sound nor noble.
who lack resources only when plans for universal day care proceed.
This whole concept of equity seems to be based on a vulgar
environmentalist-neo-Malthusian interpretation of the reality that
Thus, the only isthe goods of society are ultimately limited.
Instead, the pie can and must
sue becomes how the pie is divided.
It is precisegrow, albeit in different and less polluting ways.
ly in times of economic growth that the poor improve their status
disproportionately, and begin to bridge the gap between themselves
When times get hard, when there is no economand the well-to-do.
ic growth, the poor tend to suffer more, in spite of all schemes
for providing more equity.
"It is criminal to expect the Third World to remain impoverished, foolish to expect the rich to share significantly with
the poor, and silly to believe the poor will become strong enough
to grasp from the prosperous by force.
But given continued economic growth, the next century will see the world-wide abolition
of historical poverty.... "-".As with the Third World, so with the
United States.
In the expanding society of the 60's while all grew
wealthier, the poor and Blacks increased their
share of the wealth
proportionately more.
Not so in the 70's.
Universal programs give the middle class something. Under
those conditions, it will tend not to object if they give the
poor more. But take away from the middle class what it has, make
it pay for a program for which it is ineligible, as selective
programs try to, and it will fight the program, limit it, or
make it ugly.
Equity is also unreal in programs which do not cover the target population. We often read about ineligibles on welfare, but
a vast number of those eligible never get public assistance nor
benefit from any selective program.
Selective programs tend to
play it close to the vest -- one does not see signs in the subway inviting a visit to your friendly welfare center to see if you
are eligible. Money allocated for these programs assumes less
than full participation. In spite of "alerts", "outreach", and
Welfare Rights, a significant
percentage of eligibles
either
don't
know about programs, are too ashamed to apply, can't
negotiate the
bureaucratic maze, or are unfairly
found ineligible
and don't
appeal. There's no equity in programs which inevitably reach only the aggressive poor.
1. Sidney Levenstein, "Day Care: Gold Coin or Brass Check?", Social
Work, Vol. 17, Y5, 9/72.
2. B. Bruce-Briggs, "Against the Neo-Malthusians", Commentary,
July 1974, p. 26.
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3. "We" versus "They"
The idea that developing "poor consciousness", like "Black
consciousness", is the road to helping the poor, is particularly
patronizing. The late Richard Titmuss pointed out that the dismally poor turnout in poverty board elections under OEO was not a
question of poor organization or communication so much as it was
a rejection by the vast majority of the poor of a system in which
they had to declare themselves to be poor to be eligible to vote.
The very idea that it is no longer stigmatizing to be seen as poor
Anyone familiar with the poor knows that
is romantic nonsense.
most of the poor believe poor is bad. Ask those who turn in food
stamp vouchers at the supermarket and find the checkout clerks
evaluating their choices of purchases. Organization of the poor
is a no-win situation, because the best leadership often loses
"Poor pride" is the
eligibility in the club, by earning money.
other side of F. Scott Fitzgerald's mistaken notion that the very
rich are different from you and me; it is like the "culture of
poverty" writers who romanticize and blame the poor for their povSingling out the poor as the recipient
erty all in one chapter.
of programs, or as the single focus of organization, is self dePoor people should be part of organizations and recipifeating.
needs.
with others to achieve their
ents of services in coalition
4. Technology
PeoFinally, we come to the most persuasive argument of all.
ple who do not want the poor to be stigmatized, do not want them
to have second class service, believe that the new kind of selective
Everyone will fill
programs are not selective in the old sense.
out the same income tax form; under the Family Assistance Plan,
or other negative income tax plans, the poor would have a net gain
from the government while others would pay in.
Everyone could take advantage of precisely the same health
policymakers in the 60's in a simiservices, argued some British
that
on the way out each person would have
just
It's
lar dispute.
Those who were able to pay,
card punched at the desk.
his
credit
based on what the card indicated, would then receive a bill; the
No difference in service, no stigma to the cliothers would not.
ent, no problem in this modern age of making our welfare dollar
In a classic
go further by selecting out those who really need it.
piece in the New Statesman, Titmuss explained how selective proquality of selective programs no matter how they
thl
grams retain
Tske the example of the health "credit card" to
are structured.
save money, in a system which had previously offered free universal health care for all citizens. Would the person who had to
pay for health care because of his income still have to pay if
the medical care was based on an accident caused by someone else?
Suppose he were a veteran dealing with an injury received in warWho would pay for an illness which was picked up in a
time?

3.

"Universal & Selective Social- Services", New Statesman, 9/15/67.
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Such questions could
hospital, of which there are more than a few?
go on and on, and force a reintroduction of a whole variety of
health care systems, examining boards, screening devices, standards
for what constitutes liability, service connected injuries, workmen's compensation cases, injuries inflicted by others.
There appears to be no way in which a selective system can
avoid having bureaucrats make all sorts of moral judgments and
evaluations of people's day-to-day lives, no matter how much of
Further, there is the
the mechanism is handled by a computer.
problem of how eligibility and scales are to be determined for this
There are inherent problems in any selective system,
credit card.
Let us assume that "A" and "B" each earned
computerized or no.
$10,000 each year for ten years.
"A" spent all his income, while
Now both lose their jobs and
"B" managed to save $2,000 a year.
start collecting under the Family Assistance Plan, or receive a
health card.
Is it fair that "B" should receive the same benefit
Would it be fair if
as "A", since she has $20,000 in the bank?
"B" did not receive the same benefit as "A", and was penalized for
But suppose "B" had $100,000 in the bank, or an inher thrift?
Should she still get welfare?
heritance, or a piece of property?
All of these value questions are ones that have to be dealt with
in the organization of any selective program, computerized or not.
Now one may argue that these same questions arise in the development of an income tax system, and are therefore no more onerous in figuring eligibility for a welfare program. But there is
When a program is specifically set up to benefit
a difference.
the poor, rather than for all society, it invites constant evaluation of who is really deserving and who is not, and who is cheating the taxpayer of his hard-earned money. To the extent that we
can separate the input, or financing, end of a program from the
output, or program end, we can get a clearer and calmer look at
In fact, the various gimmicks
financing and a cleaner program.
of selectivity-eligibility, sliding scales, negative income tax,
may have even deflected America from one of the main social isThe
sties which needs to be handled, reform of the tax structure.
conJusion between the input or financing equit- and output or serWe would be better served bv
vice equity diffuses our efforts.
working to make the tax sliucture more progressive and more equitable, rather than trying to create financial equity by making
only some people eligible for programs.
The technocrats who foresee a stigma-free selectivity consistently ignore nitty-grittv questions of administration. They
write about a neat and simple FAP, just like making out one's inVolumes have been written on negative income tax;
come !ax form.
!here is still no explanation of how it could be simply administered.
In fact, an FAP type program would have to be welfare by another
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The poor can't operate on a single once-a-year check
name.
based on their earnings of the previous year. When their earnings
go up, it is not likely that they will have money to refund; when

their earnings go down, they cannot wait for assistance.

There

will be a constant parade of people with eligibility claims and
changes, and judgments will have to be made on them in a traditional welfare atmosphere of resentment and fears of cheating, be-

cause this is seen as a charitable type of program.

In other words,

negative income tax is really only a nationalized public assis-

tance program.

There will be cheating, and there will be scandals

about the cheating, and stereotypes about the poor will be main-

tained and enhanced. When the middle class is squeezed, the program will be curtailed, because programs for the poor inevitably
become poor programs.
There are other problems with selective welfare programs.
Among the worst features of selective programs is the creation of
a welfare class, a continuing group for whom welfare is a way of
life, a group which is unique, at least in size, to America, because America does not have the other institutional and universal
programs which other developed societies have to minimize welfare
children's allowances, full employment programs, universal free
For this group, leaving welfare presents probhealth care, etc.
lems of loss of benefits, loss of eligibility for a variety of
selective programs.

--

This is the "notch" problem. At one point, Nixon's FAP was
almost passed, but had to be sent back for revision, due to the
notches. As people earn or are given more money, they hit notches,
or points of ineligibility for any one of the plethora of
selective programs -- low cost housing, food stamps, Me(licaid,
etc. So that by getting more, people may be worse off, and certainly this is a disincentive to work. Economists can design
convoluted programs around the notches, but good sense cries out
for a simpler, cleaner way out of the welfare mess.
Maintaining incentives to work constantly frustrates humane
approaches to welfare in selective programs. So long as we maintain a selective approach, the onerous principle of less eligibility is inevitable. That is, the most somebody should make on
welfare ought to be less or very close to the least anyone could
make working. This sounds cruel, but in a market economy where
work incentive is based on money, there's no way out of the dilemma. The only hope is to do as other countries have done, to take
some universal system of payment such as family allowances, and/or
services, and to separate it from the market, which cannot relate
to family size or need. As Eveline Burns has written:
"This effort to build incentives into the payment system
greatly complicates administration, especially when it is recalled
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that for many of the poverty group income is highly flucuating and highly unpredictable.
Finally, we still do not
know much about the incentive effect of different rates of
taxation on the desire to work...
"It is for these reasons that I question in principle
the desirability of trying to build incentive devices into
our income security programs, sad though this would be for
economists who are having such fun today playing with models
and formulae. Why do we not separate the system for making
antipoverty payments from the system which determines how
much of total received income people should return to their
government in the form of taxes? ....
"...Why not pay everyone a demogrant, or national dividend, and let each individual earn as much or as little as
he wishes and at the end of the -ear provide for a reckoning
This would
with government through the income tax sy:stem?
enable us to make much more effective use of our tax system
as the instrument for determining, in the light of all considerations and taking all incomes into account, how much of
their income people should devote to the support of all our
nublic services (including defense).
In such a tax system,
all income, including publicly provided income, would in
principle be liable to tax, although it would probably be
decided that, as now, incomen below a certain level would
be immune from taxation...."
This is not the place to argue in detail the complex issue
of the relative merits of family allowances versus negative income taxes.
But the point is that it is the selective programs
which have the strong disincentives to work in them, a condition
universal demogrants, children's allowances, or universally available programs would tend to correct.
Selective services
There are more problems with selectivity.
must eilher assume a second-rate quality or be unfair to the nonpoor. A detached street worker program for middle and upper class
Some offidelinquents was set up in one community in the 1950's.
cials objected because the parents of these children could afford
psychiatric services -- why should the community support a street
worker? Well, if psychiatric sessions are the treatment of choice,
But if street work is particularly
the poor should get them, too.
effective with delinquent youth, why should the rich be deprived
And this is one of the most important reasons to
of this service?
stop helping the poor -the need to build one society in America.

4. Eveline Burns, "The American System of Social Security: Agenda for the 1970's", Social Economics for the 1970's, e('. by
George F. Rohlich, Dunellen, 1970, pp. 75-7C.
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Beyond the needs of ethnic pride and pluralism, the United

States is splintered badly at this time. There is a lack of a central ideelogical core with which we all identify as Americans -the mutual consent which provides the glue for a society. Liberals
recognize this when others make law and order speeches about crime.
Of course we need better police services, but ultimately no society
can exist if it depends on constant policing to prevent law breakSociety can exist only by common consent around certain norms
ing.
of behavior with police available to deal with the deviant from those
norms. While we accept this idea on crime, we may have been affectThe
ed by the law and order approach in other social policy areas.
Nadar and consumerist approach to bad institutions tends to be to
call for better policing of them. But it would be more effective
to create social institutions in which we all can feel part, in
which we all can feel pride. We need to undivide America from the
war between the hardhats and the poor. One way of doing that is
through the institution of more universal social services. Perhaps the most troublesome feature of any selective program is its
inherent divisiveness. Day care, medical care, income payments,
whatever, no matter how generous the level, creates an inevitable
war between those above and those below the eligibility line. It
is this aspect which has compounded the social cost of selectivity
to America. The war between Blacks and White ethnics, between
low middle income hardhats and the poor, is in part due to the selective approach to social welfare programs. The bitter street
wisdom that to get good medical care, or housing, or whatever, you
This comneed to be very rich or very poor, is not all wrong.
pounds the reluctance to serve the poor even while it denies the
needs of the people in between.
The development of new universal programs
It need not be so.
is possible, but social policy planners have to reawaken to the
importance of this as an issue. Can we afford the high cost involved? Poorer countries than the United States manage more universal programs. Certainly it must be possible for the United
States to devote some piece of its growth to such institutions.
The remarkable thing is that the population will pay for such programs in spite of their great costs, because everyone benefits.
The example cited about Social Security improvements should be
The basic principle is that, as the pie expands
borne in mind.
for everyone, people are more generous; as it contracts, they are
more miserly.
They can become seUniversal services are not a panacea.
In some cases, the rich "cream" or monopolize
lective, de facto.
They are more sophisticatgd about access, and can efthe service.
Or service can be left
fectively deny the service to the poor.
to the poor. We need only look at what is happening to the public

5. For a fuller discussion of this, see Alfred J. Kahn, Social
Policy & Social Services, pp.

78-83.
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schools in the cities.
We see that a formally universal program
becomes selective, if poor and Black children are the only ones in
the public schools, and all others go to private schools.
This
has to be guarded against.
What has happened in some community
colleges shows that it can be.
Where the community college is
seen as a dumping ground for the inept and poor, morale is low,
the graduates do not think well of themselves, and the community
college as a social utility
is less
meaningful.
In the parts of
the country where the free community college is supported, where
excellent faculty are hired to run first-rate programs, rich and
poor mix with a sense of pride, and this has been a factor in what
has been called the "blueing of America".
Obviously, structure
and form are crucial
to whether a social
utility
functions as
such.
Cash programs, for instance, are less easily "creamed" than
sophisticated service programs.
While there are no guarantees, it
is only with universal services that
we have a chance for
building
the institutions of a united America.
There is one final
argument that
the liberals
who support
selectivity raise.
They know that ultimately, universal programs
would be better but, they claim, we have to take what we can get.
When there is the possibility of an FAP, or a means tested health
care plan, or an SSI (Supplemental Security Income), we had better
take it
as better
than nothing.
This approach ignores the way policy develops in America. In the United States we tend toward incremental changes.
That is, programs are continued and built on
the superstructure that is originally founded.
We had better give
more attention
to basic forms and less
to specific
benefits.
Some people now think that, for all its benefits, it may have
been a mistake to support Medicaid with its
third-party
vendor payments, built-in corruption, and escalation of health costs.
Even
ifi l meant waiting for another year or two for a better plan, it
might have been worth the effort, because all improvements in Medicaid are still based on a basic poor organizing principle.
One
is reluctant to claim that such arguments outweigh the benefits of
Medicaid, but the idea is worth considering. It is sometimes better in the long run to compromise on benefits for the sake of a
better system.
For instance, in 19-2 George McGovern called for universal
demogrants of $4,000 per family of four.
He was frightened off
this proposal by the astronomical cost estimates.
But he was
wedded to the $4,000 figure, so he shifted ground to support of
a $4,000 FAP instead of Nixon's $2,400 FAP.
Finally, we got
neither.
If we had gotten a $4,000 FAP, it
might have been cut
to $2,400 by now because of a tax revolt.
But if McGovern, and
liberals generally, had stuck to the demogrant principle, even if
the figure were cut to $2,000, or set up to cover only children,
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and such a plan had passed Congress, it could only improve, as
Social Security does, because of the nature of the broad constituency served.
Our position is that universal concepts and programs are not
only superior to selective social services -- we believe they may
The time has come for social planners
be at least as marketable.
issue again, to
to make universalism a live
to make the effort,
the kinds of programs in America which can
lay the groundwork for
bring us together.
truly
We have houses
Universal programs are not so wild a dream.
on fire in the United States today. Any one may cause our house
department committed to fighting all
We need a fire
to burn down.
of us, to the extent
supported by all
wherever they arise,
fires,
we can. Helping the poor alone helps neither the poor nor the
nation.
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